Moral Disagreement Has a Social Life Before It Settles Metaethics

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What is the is-ought problem?

Hume's is-ought problem states that an ought-conclusion does not follow validly from premises that state only what is the case. In Book III of A Treatise of Human Nature, published in 1740, Hume observes moral writers moving from is and is not to ought and ought not without giving the required reason. The point concerns the logical gap between description and norm, not a ban on moral reasoning.

What is Moore's open-question argument?

G. E. Moore's open-question argument asks whether a proposed definition of good still leaves a meaningful question: is that property good? In Principia Ethica, published in 1903, Moore argues that questions such as whether pleasure is good remain informative rather than tautological. He takes this as evidence that goodness is not identical to a natural property such as pleasure, desire, or evolutionary fitness.

Does moral realism mean that everyone agrees about morality?

No. Moral realism holds that moral properties or facts are real and mind-independent; it does not predict unanimity among moral judges. Naturalist realism identifies moral properties with natural properties discovered empirically, while non-natural realism treats them as irreducible. Both positions allow error, incomplete evidence, different background beliefs, and disagreement about how moral reasons apply to a case.

Is expressivism just saying that moral claims are feelings?

No. Expressivism treats moral claims as expressing attitudes or acceptance of norms rather than describing mind-independent moral facts, but its developed versions preserve logical structure. Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism reconstructs realist-sounding moral discourse from projected attitudes, while Allan Gibbard's norm-expressivism models acceptance of systems of norms. Both address the Frege-Geach problem about moral claims inside conditionals and arguments.

What does error theory say about a claim like cruelty is wrong?

J. L. Mackie's error theory treats ordinary substantive moral claims as truth-apt claims that purport to describe objective values, then denies that any such values exist. In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, published in 1977, Mackie concludes that claims such as cruelty is wrong are systematically false. This differs from expressivism, which denies that moral claims fundamentally aim to describe objective facts.

Does moral disagreement prove that objective values do not exist?

No. Mackie's argument from relativity treats deep and persistent moral disagreement as support for the view that groups invent different moral codes, but the observation does not logically settle moral ontology. Realists can explain disagreement through error, partial access to moral facts, disputed non-moral evidence, or different applications of shared standards. Treating a measured group difference as decisive evidence for anti-realism is speculation, not an established result.

What is the difference between normative and informational influence?

Normative influence changes an outward response to gain approval or avoid the discomfort of standing out, even when private belief remains unchanged. Informational influence changes private belief because a group response is treated as evidence about reality. Morton Deutsch and Harold Gerard formalized the distinction in 1955. Private responding weakens normative influence more than informational influence because the audience is removed.

What did Asch's conformity experiments actually find?

In Solomon Asch's line-judgment experiments, published initially in 1951 and expanded in 1956, participants conformed to an obviously incorrect unanimous majority on close to one-third of critical trials. About 75% conformed at least once across 12 critical trials, while roughly 25% never conformed. A single dissenting ally reduced conforming responses from roughly one-third to about 5%, showing that unanimity mattered more than a larger majority.

Does social psychology show that people always blame character instead of circumstances?

No. The fundamental attribution error concerns observers over-weighting dispositional explanations for other people's behavior despite situational causes. Edward Jones and Victor Harris found this pattern in 1967, but Joan Miller's 1984 comparison found American samples more dispositional and Hindu Indian samples more situational. Bertram Malle's 2006 meta-analysis of 170 tests found the broader actor-observer asymmetry practically absent in aggregate.

Why is the psychology replication headline not a universal fact?

The Open Science Collaboration reported in 2015 that 36% of 97 originally significant studies reached p < .05 in replication, with success varying roughly from 23% to 48% across three source journals. Gilbert, King, Pettigrew, and Wilson challenged the estimate's interpretation in 2016. Anderson and colleagues replied that the evidence permits multiple interpretations, so the figure does not establish one settled replication rate for all psychology.

What does the WEIRD criticism change about moral-disagreement research?

Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan's 2010 WEIRD paper argues that samples from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies are often statistical outliers rather than stand-ins for humanity. The criticism limits generalization from a sample to human moral judgment in general. It does not decide whether moral facts exist, whether moral judgments are truth-apt, or whether a particular metaethical theory is correct.

Can a social explanation of a moral judgment also be a reason to assess it?

Yes, but the two assessments are different. A social explanation can identify conformity, authority, audience pressure, or dispositional attribution as causes of a moral judgment. Metaethical assessment asks what kind of claim that judgment is and what would make it correct, false, or rationally defensible. A causal account may reveal bias or evidence conditions without replacing the separate question of moral truth.